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Abstract
Globalisation (in the sense of increased international trade) is usually associated with
gains from trade but also distributional effects where e.g. capital owners gain and work-
ers lose, both in real terms. In recent years, globalisation seems to be synonymous to
international mergers of ﬁrms. This paper shows in a model with Cournot competition
that international mergers due to globalisation also imply gains from trade. Under plausi-
ble assumptions for capital intensities and in contrast to the usual results, however, both
capital owners and workers gain in real terms. This effect is due to the reduction in the
consumption good price caused by an increase in competition.
1 Introduction
Mergers seem to be more common in times of globalisation. The European Commission
(1999)reportsthatthenumberofmergers(thatfellunderthecontroloftheDirectorate–General
for Competition of the European Commission) rose steadily from 50 in 1991 to approximately
250 in 1999. Mergers and their link to globalisation play a major role also in public discussions.
Whenever one ﬁrm buys another and especially when a foreign company acquires a domestic
one (think of Vodafone buying Mannesmann in 2000 or BMW buying Rover in 1994), the
press is ﬂooded with distributional statements by politicians and lobbyists: ’Mergers are good
for stock markets’ or ’mergers will be bad for workers’ are just a few.
Surprisingly, international trade theory provides little guidance for understanding distribu-
tional effects of mergers caused by increased international trade. There is a huge literature
on mergers and why ﬁrms merge in a closed economy context (e.g. Gowrisankaran, 1999;
Jacquemin and Slade, 1992) but almost no mention of mergers due to international trade (this
will be further discussed below). There has of course also been a considerable amount of re-
search (also discussed below) on distributional aspects of international trade but, again, with
no reference to mergers and the mechanism we have in mind.
We propose to ﬁll this gap by presenting a model that links distributional effects of mergers
due to globalisation to factor intensities in management and production technologies. Imagine
an economy endowed with capital and labour that produces one homogeneous consumption
good in a market with Cournot competition. The production technology is characterised by
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1constant returns to scale. Production can only take place under managerial guidance, however,
which is also characterised by constant returns to scale. As a ﬁxed amount of management
servicesis required forproduction, the entire productionprocess of consumptiongoods exhibits
increasing returns. Free entry pins down the endogenous number of ﬁrms in the economy by
driving proﬁts to zero.
Now let globalisation take place, i.e. let two countries with identical capital to labour ratios
open up to trade.1 As a ﬁrm faces more competitors in a now global market, the markup
over marginal costs decreases and output of the representative ﬁrm has to expand in order to
cover managerial costs. The number of ﬁrms under trade is therefore lower than the sum of
the number of ﬁrms of both countries in autarky: Mergers have taken place due to intensiﬁed
international trade.
This expansion of production activities of the representative ﬁrm implies that factors move
from managerial to production activities. If production activities are more capital intensive
than managerial activities, globalisation through mergers leads to an increase in the factor re-
wards for capital (i.e. an increase of stock prices) relative to the price of the consumption good
and a decrease in wages relative to capital rewards.2 If capital rewards increase relative to
wages, capital rewards also increase in real terms (i.e. in terms of the consumption good), just
as in the Stolper–Samuelson theorem under perfect competition. Due to our imperfect com-
petition setup, wages losing relative to capital still increase in real terms if international trade
sufﬁciently reduces the domestic distortion caused by oligopolistic ﬁrms. In a Cobb–Douglas
world and for plausible parameter values, both factors of production gain in real terms.
The only author we are aware of who seems to consider international trade as a cause of
mergers is Bliss (1986, sect. 7.6). He argues that ﬁrms are induced to merge under free trade
(when compared to autarky) as this may require a reduction in the number of active ﬁrms.3
Clearly, the mechanism behind Bliss’ argument, which is also the mechanism we employ, is
well–understood e.g. from the literature on optimal trade policy and welfare issues in models
with Cournot competition (Dixit, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Venables, 1985; Eaton
and Grossman, 1986).4 One of the contributions of the present paper therefore is to suggest
the interpretation that mergers are behind this theoretical ﬁnding. Such an interpretation allows
to analyse the important policy question of distributional effects of mergers in a very simple
framework (´ a la Jones, 1965).
Distributional issues of international trade have a long tradition and recently received re-
newed attention in the discussion of the technology vs. trade explanation of increases in wage
inequality.5 The link between international trade and domestic inequality in almost all studies
1 Studying international trade between countries with different capital to labour ratios would yield additional
results besides the one we want to stress. These results are already well–known from other analyses, however.
2 Lawrence and Spiller (1983) also allow for different capital intensities in their two–sector monopolistic–
competition model. In their model, the total number of ﬁrms globally is the same under autarky as under
free trade.
3 There is a small literature on international mergers (e.g. Falvey, 1998; Head and Ries, 1997) or international
merger policies (e.g. Horn and Levinsohn, 2001). Due to their partial equilibrium approach, both interna-
tional trade as a cause of mergers or the general equilibrium distributional effects that we have in mind are not
considered.
4 This result can also be obtained in a Dixit–Stiglitz–type imperfect competition setup. See e.g. Flam and Help-
man’s (1987) analysis of industrial policy in a two–country world.
5 See for example the Policy Forum in the September 1998 issue of the Economic Journal (Greenaway, 1998).
2is provided by the Stolper–Samuelson theorem.6 We present a mechanism where distributional
effects occur without exogenous changes in international terms of trade and, our central result,
where the Stolper–Samuelson results continues to hold in relative but not in real terms.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 shows how this model can be analysed using
the approach of Jones (1965), despite our imperfect Cournot competition approach. Section 4
and 5 present the results and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 A closed economy
The economy is endowed with a ﬁxed amount of capital K and labour L. Production of the
homogeneous consumption good X requires a production process and management services.
The production process itself takes place under constant returns to scale
x = x(kx;lx);
where x(¢) has the standard neoclassical properties. The amount of capital and labour employed
in a ﬁrm is denoted by kx and lx, respectively. Total output is given by the sum of output x of
all n ﬁrms in the market, X = nx.7 As ﬁrms behave as Cournot competitors, the price px of the
consumption good is given by




As usual, alx and akx indicate the amount of labour and capital used to produce one unit of good
x. Hence, the term in brackets gives unit costs as a function of factor rewards for capital (r) and
labour (w). The parameter µ denotes the markup over the unit costs.
Production can take place only under managerial guidance. Management requires both
capital and labour and is also provided under constant returns to scale,
¯ m = m(km;lm);
with m(¢) also having standard neoclassical properties. The amount of management services
required for production in each ﬁrm is ﬁxed at ¯ m. Managerial services can be provided either
in–house or bought on the market. In the former case, each ﬁrm minimises the costs associated
with the provision of ¯ m. Assuming perfect competition in the management sector for the latter
case, both interpretations are formally equivalent. In what follows, we will present results
taking the market perspective. Then, the price pm equals unit costs,
pm = almw+akmr: (2)









6 An exception is e.g. Neary (2000, sect.4) or Vandenbussche and Konings (1998).
7 We anticipate the fact that all ﬁrms will have the same size as they all face identical marginal costs.
3The existence of a ﬁxed input requirement for management services is comparable to ﬁxed
costs.8 With free entry, proﬁts are driven to zero, so that pxx=(alxw+akxr)x+pm ¯ m. Using the
pricing equation (1), the zero proﬁt condition requires the equality between operating proﬁts




= pm ¯ m: (3)
A factor market equilibrium requires the equality of labour supply sL and labour demand
in production, alxnx, and for management, almn ¯ m. With an identical equation for capital, we
obtain
sL = alxnx+almn ¯ m; (4)
sK = akxnx+akmn ¯ m; (5)
where s is a scale parameter to be explained and applied later.
The system of equations (1)–(5) characterises the equilibrium of the economy. As nu-
meraire, we normalise the price pm for management services to unity. Equations (1)–(5) spec-
ify the values for the factor prices (w;r), the product price px, the number (n) of ﬁrms and
the output (x) of an individual ﬁrm as a function of the exogenously given factor endowments
(K;L) and the scale parameter s.
2.2 Analysing the effects of globalisation
Globalisation is deﬁned the economy opening up for trade in goods and services, i.e. we
assume management services to be internationally tradable.9 Suppose, two or more countries
structured as described in section 2.1 only differ with respect to their market size s. When
they commence trading, they will experience factor price equalisation through trade in the con-
sumption good and in management services unless one of these countries becomes completely
specialised under trade. This follows directly from equations (1) and (2) where n is now the
numbers of ﬁrms in the world as a whole.
The effects of integrating into a world with different relative factor endowments K=L than
in the home country on the trade pattern and factor rewards have been widely studied and
are well understood. Therefore, we focus on the integration process of two or more countries
having identical relative factor endowments. Then, the integration process is identical to an
equiproportional increase of any of these economies’ resource base. In terms of the model
described, integration is equivalent to increasing the parameter s.
3 Deriving the reduced form
We can analyse the model using the same approach as Jones (1965), despite the presence of
imperfect competition features in our model. Similar to Jones, we study proportional changes
8 The price for management services pm and, therefore, the associated costs pm ¯ m may respond to parameter
changes. Fixed costs would not.
9 Examples would include General Motors, where the US headquarter provides the new designs for Ford pro-
duced in Germany. Generally speaking, if management services were in–house activities, ﬁrms would locate
their managers (plus equipment) where unit costs are lowest. Again, in–house management and management
provided through the market are formally equivalent.
4of endogenous variables as a function of proportional changes of exogenous ones. In our case,
the following set of equations determines the proportional changes of x;n;w;r;px as functions
of the proportional change in the market size s (cf. appendix):




¡(qlm ˆ alm+qkm ˆ akm) = qlm ˆ w+qkmˆ r (2’)
ˆ px = ˆ n¡ ˆ x (3’)
ˆ s¡(llx ˆ alx+llm ˆ alm) = llxˆ x+ ˆ n (4’)
ˆ s¡(lkx ˆ akx+lkm ˆ akm) = lkxˆ x+ ˆ n (5’)
The coefﬁcient lij stands for the fraction of the factor i used in the production of good j (cf.
appendix, equation (15)). As factors are fully employed, fractions add to unity, i.e. lix+lim =
1, i = x;m. The coefﬁcient qij denotes the share of value added (adjusted for markups) going
to factor i in industry j (cf. appendix, equation (19)). Accordingly, the shares of both factors
add to unity, i.e. qli+qki = 1, i = x;m.
Equations (1’) and (2’) describe how prices and wages respond to parameter changes. A
’hat’ denotes proportional changes, i.e. ˆ z = dz=z. In the oligopolistic consumption good sector
(1’), changes in factor rewards are accommodated by changes in the price px, in technologies
(the term in brackets on the left–hand side) and by changes in the markup. The deﬁnition in
(1) of the markup implies that its proportional change is given by ˆ µ = ¡ˆ n=(n¡1). For the
management sector, equation (2’) illustrates that changes in the factor prices are balanced by
adjustments in technologies only. The price pm for management services cannot adjust, as it
was chosen as numeraire.
Equation(3’)stemsfromthezeroproﬁtcondition(3). Asthepriceformanagementservices
was set to unity and a ﬁxed amount of management services is required, it simply says that zero
proﬁts prevail only if the operating proﬁts from sales of the consumption good remain constant
(in nominal terms).10
Equations (4’) and (5’) describe equilibrium changes on the factor market. An equipropor-
tional increase ˆ s in the market size is accommodated by changes in the technology (the term
in the brackets on the left–hand side) and changes in the supply (the right–hand side). As the
demand of a single ﬁrm for management services is ﬁxed, supply can only vary when either
output x of the representative ﬁrm or the number n of ﬁrms change. Since the factor shares of
both sectors add to one, ˆ n is not weighted.
Equations (1’)–(5’) can be simpliﬁed. As both oligopolistic consumption good ﬁrms and
perfectly competitive management ﬁrms minimise production costs and are price takers on the
factor markets, we obtain
qli ˆ ali+qki ˆ aki = 0; i = x;m (6)
for both types of ﬁrms (cf. appendix). Firms produce at minimum costs when the cost of an
additional unit of labour is exactly offset by marginally reducing the amount of capital. This
condition simpliﬁes the pricing equations (1’) and (2’) as the brackets on the left–hand side
disappear.
10 We will see below that proﬁts will need to change in terms of the consumption good.
5The zero proﬁt condition (3’) can be used in equation (1’). Subtracting equation (2’) from
the resulting condition yields
ˆ x¡µˆ n+jqj( ˆ w¡ ˆ r) = 0; (7)
where jqj is the determinant of the factor share matrix q (cf. appendix, equation (22)). Equation
(21) in the appendix shows that the determinant jqj is negative if the technology for producing
the consumption good is capital intensive relative to the technology for management services
(as we assume). This equation is the ﬁrst one to be used in the reduced form.
With linear homogenous production functions and perfect competition on factor markets,
the elasticity of substitution between the factors of production in sector i can be written as si =
(ˆ aki¡ ˆ ali)=( ˆ w¡ ˆ r). Together with the appropriate equation from (6), we obtain (cf. appendix)
llx ˆ alx+llm ˆ alm = dl( ˆ w¡ ˆ r); (8)
lkx ˆ akx+lkm ˆ akm = ¡dk( ˆ w¡ ˆ r); (9)
where dl ´ (llxqkxsx +llmqkmsm) and dk ´ (lkxqlxsx +lkmqlmsm). These equations can be
used to replace changes in technology in factor market conditions (4’) and (5’) by changes in
relative factor rewards. This yields
llxˆ x+ ˆ n¡dl( ˆ w¡ ˆ r) = ˆ s (10)
lkxˆ x+ ˆ n+dk( ˆ w¡ ˆ r) = ˆ s (11)
Together with equation (7), the modiﬁed factor market equilibrium conditions (10) and (11)
constitute a system of equations which determines the effect of changes in the exogenous
variable s, i.e. the effect of globalisation, on the endogenous variables (n;x;w=r). For later
purposes, we summarise these equations as























4 Aggregate effects of globalisation
The ﬁrst question to be answered is whether the number of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms grows propor-
tionally or under–proportionally when countries integrate, i.e. when s increases. In the former
case, no mergers would take place: The number of ﬁrms in the globalisation equilibrium is just
the sum of the number of ﬁrms in the countries’ autarky state. In the latter case the world–wide
number of ﬁrms in a trading situation is lower than the sum of the number of ﬁrms in autarky
— international trade implies mergers.
Answering this ﬁrst question implies answers to further questions about ﬁrm and industry
output, gains from trade and, our main focus, about changes in relative factor rewards. All
results and proofs are valid for any number of countries which have an arbitrary size.
Proposition 1. The number of sector x ﬁrms rises under–proportionally if the market sizes s
increases, i.e.
ˆ s > 0 ) 0 < ˆ n < ˆ s:
6Proof. Deﬁne j1 ´ jqjjlj, j2 ´ dl +dk and j3 ´ µ(dllkx +dkllx). This deﬁnition directly implies
j2; j3 > 0. From (17) and (21) with rx > rm we know j1 > 0. Using (18), the determinant of the Jacobi
matrix in (12) can be written asjJj= j1+ j2+ j3 >0 and the second element of adj Jd is ˆ s(j1+ j2)´Jnˆ s.
Hence, ˆ n = ˆ s(j1+ j2)=jJj. As j1+ j2 < jJj, it follows that 0 < ˆ n < ˆ s if ˆ s > 0.
This proposition can be illustrated as follows: Giving a dynamic interpretation to a static
model, there would be åna
c ﬁrms in the market immediately after economies have removed
prohibitive trade barriers, where na
c is the number of ﬁrms in autarky in country c. Proposition
1 indicates that this situation is not sustainable in the long run. The adjustment process is
therefore characterised by an reduction of the number of ﬁrms, i.e. mergers take place.
As is generally argued, one of the main objectives for mergers are higher proﬁts obtained
by a reduction in costs. In fact, immediately after opening up to trade, ﬁrms make losses. As
each ﬁrm requires a ﬁxed amount of management services to run the business, two ﬁrms can al-
ways reduce their costs by merging (given the constant price of management services). Hence,
mergers driven by a cost reduction motive indeed take place until the zero proﬁt condition holds
again.
Proposition 2. The output x of a ﬁrm increases with the market sizes s, i.e.
ˆ s > 0 ) ˆ x > 0:
Proof. Let j1, j2, j3 and jJj be deﬁned as above. The ﬁrst element of adj Jd is ˆ sµj2 ´ Jxˆ s so that
ˆ x = ˆ sJx=jJj. As jJj > 0, it follows that ˆ x > 0 if ˆ s > 0.
This is an intuitive outcome of the Cournot setup. As there are more ﬁrms in the market
after opening up, the markup µ in (1) shrinks. With constant ﬁxed costs, ﬁrms need to produce
more in order earn the same amount of the operating proﬁts that allow to cover these ﬁxed
costs.
The next proposition combines the previous two to obtain information on the output of the
industry.
Proposition 3. The output of the consumption good industry increases over–proportionally as
the market size rises, i.e.
ˆ s > 0 ) ˆ n+ ˆ x > ˆ s:
Proof. Let j1, j2, j3, jJj, Jx and Jn be deﬁned as above. Then, ˆ n+ ˆ x = ˆ s(Jn+Jx)=jJj. As lkx;llx < 1,
µj2 > j3 so that Jn+Jx > jJj and ˆ n+ ˆ x > ˆ s.
Thiseffectcanalsobeexplainedwithincreasingcompetitioninsectorx. Astheworld–wide
number of oligopolistic ﬁrms reduces due to globalisation (with trade, there are fewer ﬁrms
in the world as when all countries in autarky), there is less employment in the management
sector after globalisation. Factors of production therefore move from the management to the
production sector and total output increases. As this effect holds for each country individually
(each country produces more but does not change its size), the increase in industry output ˆ n+ ˆ x
must be larger than the increase ˆ s in the market size.
This proposition implies the following
Corollary 1. There are gains from trade.
7Proof. For monotonous utility functions, social welfare u is an increasing function of output X of the
consumption good normalised by country size s, u = u(X=s), u0(¢) > 0. As ˆ n+ ˆ x¡ ˆ s > 0 by the last
proposition, X=s increases as country size increases. Welfare u therefore rises when countries integrate.
Propositions 1 and 3 provide a relationship between the change in output of the ﬁnal goods
sector, of the management sector and in the market size:
Proposition 4. When the market size increases due to globalisation, output of the consump-
tion good grows faster than market size which in turn grows faster than the overall supply of
management services, i.e.
ˆ s > 0 ) ˆ X > ˆ s > ˆ M:
Proof. The industry supply of sector x and m have to satisfy X = nx and M = n ¯ m. As ¯ m is invariant,
ˆ X = ˆ n+ ˆ x and ˆ M = ˆ n. By propositions 1 and 3 we ﬁnd that ˆ X = ˆ n+ ˆ x > ˆ s > ˆ n = ˆ M.
This proposition is similar to the Rybczynski theorem, only that we consider an equipro-
portional increase of the economy. This is the second ’classic’ theorem in addition to factor
price equalisation implied by (1) and (2) (no attention is paid to Heckscher–Ohlin issues as
mentioned in footnote 1).
5 Distributional effects of globalisation
We now turn to our variant of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem which highlights the link
between globalisation, mergers and relative factor rewards.
Proposition 5. Capital rewards r rise relative to wages w following an increase in the market
size s whenever the production of the consumption good is more capital intensive than produc-
tion of management services, i.e.











Proof. Let the determinant of the Jacobi matrix be deﬁned as above. The third element of adj Jd is
ˆ sµjlj so that ˆ r¡ ˆ w = ¡ˆ sµjlj=jJj. Then, the proposition follows directly from equation (17).
TheintuitionbehindthispropositionissimilartotheintuitionbehindtheStolper–Samuelson
theorem. Continue to assume that the consumption good is capital intensive relative to man-
agement services. When world–wide output of management services declines, the proportion
of labour relative to capital that becomes available is, at given relative factor prices, higher than
the proportion that ﬁrms in the production sector are willing to absorb. Full employment can
therefore only be restored if ﬁrms (in both sectors) substitute labour for capital. The latter takes
place only if factor rewards for labour decrease relatively to factor rewards for capital.
Surprisingly, a relative decline of wages does not necessarily (as in a perfect competition
model) imply a decline of wages in terms of the consumption good:
8Proposition 6. The factor of production that gains relative to the other factor, also gains in
real terms,










¡ ˆ px > 0:
Proof. The proof holds for the case where capital owners gain relatively to labour, ˆ r¡ ˆ w > 0. Sub-
tracting equation (1’) from ˆ r and noting that the bracket term on the left–hand side vanishes gives
ˆ r ¡ ˆ px = qlx(ˆ r ¡ ˆ w)+ ˆ n=(n¡1). Both terms on the right–hand side are positive. The proof for the
opposite case where ˆ r¡ ˆ w < 0 follows equivalent steps.
Proposition 7. The factor of production that loses relative to the other factor, loses in real
terms only if competition was high already in autarky, i.e. if the number na of ﬁrms in autarky
is above a certain threshold level n¤,










¡ ˆ px < 0:
Proof. This proof is also only for the case where capital owners gain relatively to labour, ˆ r¡ ˆ w > 0.
Subtracting equation (1’) from ˆ w gives




The ﬁrst term on the right–hand side is negative, the second one is positive. Applying the expression
for ˆ r¡ ˆ w derived in the proof for proposition (5) and the one for ˆ n derived in the proof for proposition
(1), the equation can be rewritten as (cf. appendix) ˆ w¡ ˆ px = (qkxnjlj+jqjjlj+dl +dk)ˆ s=(jJj(n¡1)).
Hence, wages fall in real terms,
ˆ w¡ ˆ px < 0; if (qkxnjlj+jqjjlj+dl +dk)ˆ s < 0 ()




The threshold level n¤ is positive if the consumption good is more capital intensive than management
services.
Equation (13) nicely reveals the intuition behind these two propositions. Changes in real
factor rewards depend on changes in relative factor rewards (as in the Stolper–Samuelson theo-
rem) caused by factor reallocation, as captured by the ﬁrst term on the right–hand side, and on
changes in the number of ﬁrms in the economy, the second term on the right–hand side of the
equation. An increase of this second term represents an increase in competition and thereby a
reduction in the distortion on the ﬁnal good market. As international trade increases the number
of competitors, this second term stands for the reduction of the markup which implies, ceteris
paribus, higher real factor rewards. Real capital rewards therefore increase as both the relative
change in factor rewards (i.e. the reallocation from management to production) and the increase
in competition imply higher real capital rewards. Real labour rewards may also increase if the
competition effect outweighs the loss implied by the reallocation to the production sector.
This discussion directly implies the following
Corollary 2. (a) If a country characterized by a strong domestic inefﬁciency (few domestic
ﬁrms) starts trading, there are gains from trade and both factors of production gain in real
terms.
9(b) If a country with a large number of domestic ﬁrms starts trading, capital proﬁts and
labour loses in real terms.
These are clearly second–best world results. While these are usually employed to demon-
strate that standard efﬁciency effects (e.g. gains from trade) do not necessarily hold in the pres-
ence of one additional or more distortions (for a short overview, cf. Bhagwati (1994)), here,
second–best effects imply that standard distributional effects (losses in real factor rewards)
may be invalidated.
More precise results are available for a Cobb–Douglas economy. The appendix proves the
following
Corollary 3. Let a and b denote the capital intensities in the production and management
sectors, respectively. Real wages also rise due to globalisation (i.e. the difference between the
threshold level n¤ and the number na of ﬁrms in autarky is positive, na < n¤ in equation (14)),
if (1+b)=2 > a.
For the extreme case where b almost zero, this holds if a < 0:5 since then 1¡a > 0:5
and a¡b < 0:5. The average share of capital in output is approximately 1=3 in industrialised
countries. Hence, with e.g. a = 0:4 and b = 0:2 (to obtain roughly 1=3 on average), this
condition holds. For less extreme values of b, this condition holds for values of a > 0:5 as
well. We conclude that for reasonable parameter values, the threshold level n¤ is always higher
than the number n of ﬁrms in autarky. Factors of production that lose in relative terms therefore
gain in real terms.
6 Conclusion
We have analysed a model with Cournot competition and free entry and exit where pro-
duction requires a ﬁxed amount of management services. As international trade increases,
the number of ﬁrms active in a market and the markup of ﬁrms decreases in the number of
competitors, international trade leads to an expansion of plant size. The number of ﬁrms pro-
ducing under trade is therefore lower than the sum of the number of ﬁrms producing in autarkic
economies. The interpretation given to this result is that international trade induces ﬁrms to
merge. In this sense, globalisation leads to mergers.
Assuming that the production technology is more capital intensive than the management
technology, international trade implies an increase of the production sector and a decrease of
management services. These factor movements lead to a decline in capital intensity in all
sectors and therefore an increase of factor rewards for capital relative to wages.
Measuring factor rewards in real terms, mergers caused by globalisation imply an increase
in real capital rewards, real wages may fall or rise, depending on the degree of domestic distor-
tions before opening up to trade.
If domestic distortions were weak (e.g. in a large country with many ﬁrms), globalisation
through mergers implies a real decrease in wages. If domestic distortions were strong (in a
country with few ﬁrms), globalisation leads to a considerable increase in the number of ﬁrms
and therefore to a strong reduction of the distortion. This positive effect can outweigh the neg-
ative effect of losses of wages relative to capital caused by factor relocation from management
10to production. In a Cobb–Douglas economy with plausible parameter values, real wages rise
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